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MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



**RISALDAR & HONY CAPTAIN JAGDISH SINGH (Then NAIB
RISALDAR)**

SERVICE NUMBER	JC-29007
RANK	Risaldar & Hony Captain (Then Naib Risaldar)
NAME	Jagdish Singh
SON OF	Shri Mohan Singh
RESIDENT OF (Village/District/State)/ DOMICILE	Village Prithipur, Tika Gangath, Kangra, HimachalPradesh
UNIT/REGIMENT/CORPS	CENTRAL INDIA HORSE
SERVICE	Indian Army
DATE OF ENROLMENT/ COMMISSION	23 March 1945
AWARD/DATE OF ACTION	Vir Chakra / 10 September 1965
WAR/BATTLE/OPERATION	1965 Indo Pak War
OTHER AWARDS WITH DATE	



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Risaldar & Hony Captain (Then Naib Risaldar) Jagdish Singh was born on 23 March 1927, at Prithipur, Tika Gangath village of Kangra District in Himachal Pradesh. His father's name was Shri Mohan Singh. Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh was enrolled into CENTRAL INDIA HORSE of the Indian Army on 23 March 1945 at the age of eighteen. During the 1965 Indo Pak War, he was deployed in Burki Village, where he brought down accurate and heavy fire on the enemy force and helped in capturing the objective swiftly.

The Central Indian Horse was raised in 1857 for service during the Indian Mutiny (1857-1859). Known initially as Mayne's Horse after its founder Henry Otway Mayne. In 1860 Mayne's Horse was renamed the 1st Regiment Central India Horse. In 1860, Mayne's Horse consisted of three Regiments soon to be reduced to two, primarily for service in Central India but willing to serve anywhere, at home or abroad. The reorganization in 1903 saw the two regiments re-styled the 38th and the 39th Central India Horse and, in 1906, a Royal Colonel-in-Chief HRH The Prince of Wales was appointed, making both regiments 'Prince of Wales's Own' a title changed a few years later, on the prince's accession, to 'King George's Own'. The Great War saw the 38th in France in December 1914 as part of the Mhow Brigade of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division. They moved on to Palestine under Allenby and finally returned to India in February 1921 after further service Syria, after more than six years abroad. In the 39th Central India Horse remained in India throughout the war.

In 1923, the 38th and 39th with their shared title and common origins enjoyed a virtually painless merger into one regiment as The Central India Horse (21st King George V's Own Horse). The badge was crossed lances with the monogram CIH on the intersection and a crown above. Mechanization was ordered in September 1939 and the Regiment handed over its horses to Hodson's Horse prior to moving to Secunderabad in November on conversion to a motor cavalry regiment. On Partition in August 1947, the Regiment was allotted to India. Their Punjabi Mussalman Squadron was transferred to the 19th Lancers, who were going to Pakistan, in exchange for the latter's Jat Squadron. During the 1947-48 war with Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir the Regiment fought with distinction.

In 1950, the Regiment was renamed The Central India Horse, which is today one of the decorated regiments of the Indian Army. The Central India Horse is now a tank Regiment of the Indian Army.



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The Central Indian Horse on the march during the camp of exercise, 1885

Source: <https://collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1955-04-49-2-28>

The ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and Indian frontiers with Pakistan have remained a sensitive zone for years. Pakistan has on and off resorted to firing, incursions and intrusions at several points of these frontiers, compelling India to adopt defensive measures. These attempts of Pakistan have been met by the Indian Armed Forces with commendable bravery and steely resilience, but always with great restraint to not escalate the conflict. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 was the second war fought between these two bordering countries. While India was still recovering from the damages of Sino-India war of 1962, Pakistan saw it as an opportunity to acquire Jammu and Kashmir with might, presuming India to be weak in terms of defence preparation. The war initiated on 24 April 1965, when Pakistan Army, attacked our territory in the Rann of Kutch and penetrated six to eight miles inside the Indian territory. This act of illegal occupation of Indian territory constituted violation of Indo-Pak Border Agreement 1960 and international law as per the United Nations Charter. The Pakistani forces subsequently intruded in Kashmir with the launch of Operation Gibraltar.

The infiltration of the Gibraltar Force at various points across the 750-km long Cease-fire Line and the International Border between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir began on 05 August 1965. It covered areas of Jammu, Punch and Uri in the west, Tithwal in the North-West, Guraiz in the North and Kargil in the North-East. Initially, about 1,500 infiltrators crossed over in small batches, and concentrated at selected points inside Kashmir to organise themselves into larger groups. They were equipped with light automatic weapons and their aim, apart from sabotage, was to



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indoctrinate the Kashmiris so that they could revolt against India.¹ The period of the infiltration campaign was characterised by intense, hectic activity throughout the J&K Theatre with special emphasis in the Valley. The raiders and own forces marched and counter-marched all over the inhospitable terrain in a vast grim game of hide and seek. Several times during the day the opponents met, clashed and reeled apart in a series of bloody actions, weaving a confused pattern hard to unravel.²

The second batch of infiltrators, comprising some 6000 men, was pushed into Jammu and Kashmir in the third week of August. Taking into account the replacements for those who "exfiltrated", it is estimated that on the whole, about 8,000 infiltrators participated in these operations. By the first week of September 1965, a third batch of infiltrators, approximately 5,500 strong, was ready in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir for induction. But it could not be sent across the border due to the counter offensive launched by India in Punjab.³ The plan failed with their early detection and lack of support from the locals, who gave away their positions.

In sheer desperation, Pakistan also employed its artillery in support of guerrilla operations in the Chhamb area. India grasped the criticality of the ongoing plan, repulsed the attacks and cut off the entry and exit points into the Kashmir Valley. A quick and firm response by India took Pakistan by surprise and thwarted their well laid out plans. India reacted almost immediately by recapturing Kargil heights which had been returned in Jul 1965, a limited offensive in the Tithwal Sector and most importantly, the capture of Haji Pir Pass in a daring operation by 1 PARA by Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dayal under 68 Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier (later Lieutenant General) ZC Bakshi on 28 August 1965. This was one of the most notable achievements of the riposte. The capture of Haji Pir and loss of key positions in the Kishenganga Bulge were a severe setback for the Pakistanis which put them in a state of shock. Thus, by the end of August 1965, Pakistan's plans for quick annexation of the Valley had been squarely defeated.

¹ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India

² War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, VrC (1991). Lancer International, New Delhi

³ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India



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Indian Army Deployment during Operation Gibraltar

Source: 1965: A Western Sunrise: India's War with Pakistan. Shiv Kunal Verma (2021). Aleph Book Company, New Delhi

The failure of Operation Gibraltar saw the last Phase, Operation Grand Slam put into effect by General Ayub Khan on 01 September 1965. A massive attack was planned in the Chhamb-Jaurian Sector aimed at capturing Akhnur, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. In desperation, Pakistan played its hand by launching Operation 'Grand Slam' on 01 September 1965. It was launched across the Southern most portion of the CFL and was aimed at Akhnur; thus, Pakistan aimed at cutting of Indian positions in Naushera, Rajauri and Punch. Thereafter, as a part of Operation Grand Slam, an armoured thrust could be developed towards Jammu, the capture of which would have severed all land communications to Jammu & Kashmir.⁴ This would place Pakistan in a position to dictate terms to India.

⁴ 1965 Indo-Pak War – A Critical Appraisal (2015) Major General PJS Sandhu, (Retd) (Accessed on 8 September 2022) <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/1965-indo-pak-war-a-critical-appraisal/>



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Pakistan did not call off Operation 'Grand Slam' despite the security council's call for an immediate cease-fire on 4 September 1965. It even carried out an air raid on Amritsar the next day. The Indian warning that an attack against Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as an attack against India was also ignored by Pakistan. Meanwhile, apprehending a Pakistani attack, India had also formulated a contingency plan to meet the situation militarily. The Indian plan visualised a limited offensive intended to cover the area from Dera Baba Nanak in the North to the Sutlej in the South.

The objective of the retaliatory Indian plan was to threaten Lahore, drive a wedge between the Pakistani forces deployed in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors and destroy their war potential. The offensive was to serve the dual purpose of ensuring the security of Punjab by advancing the Indian defence line to the Ichhogil Canal and to capture some Pakistani territory to serve as a bargaining lever in the political parleys, on the conclusion of hostilities.

In view of the above plan, XI Corps under Lieutenant General JS Dhillon was assigned the tasks on August 1965 to destroy the enemy forces which might enter Punjab and Ganganagar Sector in Rajasthan. Also, on orders from Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, the Corps was to undertake the following measures simultaneously:

- a. To advance to the Ichhogil Canal along the axes GT road, Bhikkiwind-Khalra and Bhikkiwind-Khem Karan, to secure Pakistani territory from opposite Ranian inclusive to its junction with Dipalpur Canal opposite Hussainiwala. Also to capture intact Ichhogil Uttar road bridge, GT road bridge, Jallo road bridge and Barki bridge on Ichhogil Canal
- b. To eliminate the Pakistani bridge-head at the Dera Baba Nanak and if possible, capture the bridge on the Ravi River, intact.

The initial task of XI Corps was to secure the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal and establish bridgeheads across the Canal at some points. Surprise was achieved and the three Indian Divisions gained notable success. In the South, 4 Mountain Division, under Major General Gurbakhsh Singh, launched an attack on the Khem Karan-Kasur axis and succeeded in capturing all its objectives, either wholly or partially, by 1230 hours on 06 September. Further North, 7 Infantry Division, under Major General H K Sibal, captured Hudriara by 1030 hours. 15 Infantry Division under Major General Niranjana Prasad achieved some early success. One of its Battalions, 3 JAT crossed the Ichhogil Canal at Dograi and reached Batapore on the outskirts of Lahore. Another Battalion of the Division advanced upto the road bridge over this Canal near Bhaini Dhillwal, 9 km north of Dograi. The bridge over the Ravi River at Dera Baba Nanak was captured by 29 Infantry Brigade. These attacks, launched with speed and vigour, jolted Pakistan.



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7 Infantry Division was to secure Pakistani territory up to the East bank of the Ichhogil Canal from the Canal Track Junction (exclusive) to the Canal junction near Bedian (inclusive). In carrying out the task, priority was to be given to the capture and holding of the bridge over the Ichhogil Canal at Barki, and to deny any ingress through Bedian. One battalion was to be left for the defence of the Hussainiwala bridge, and it was to come under the command of 7 Infantry Division on arrival. The boundary between 7 Infantry Division and 4 Mountain Division was to be the Canal Junction-Patti-Sirhali Kalan.



An aerial view of Dograi – Looking towards Lahore

Source: The Monsoon War: Young Officers Reminisce. Capt. Amrinder Singh and Lt Gen Tajinder Shergill (2015).
Roli Books, New Delhi



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7 Infantry Division was tasked to advance along the Khalra-Barki axis. The International Border between India and Pakistan cut this axis just 1.6 km North West of Khalra, which was inside India. On the way to Lahore, the Upper Bhuchar Distributary and the Hudiarra Drain both running at the right angle to the road, were the two major obstacles. The Ichhogil was the third and most formidable obstacle, and Barki was located about 500 m to the east of it. The Operation Plan of 7 Infantry Division was to be carried out in two phases;

Phase I

- (a) Capture of the bridge at Barki by 48 Infantry Brigade Group by last light on 06 September.
- (b) Blocking the Pakistani ingress through Bedian by 17 RAJPUT by last light on 06 September.
- (c) After the capture of the Hudiarra Drain, 65 Infantry Brigade to send one Infantry Battalion to destroy the bridge over the Ichhogil near the Hir village.

Phase II

Mopping up along the east bank of the Ichhogil in its area of responsibility, and the destruction of all crossings over the Canal by 65 Infantry Brigade Group.⁵

⁵ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India



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Captured Pakistani Soldiers by Indian Army in Lahore District.

Source: Twitter: India History Pics <https://x.com/IndiaHistorypic/status/641269452193923077>


Major General HK Sibal, GOC 7 Infantry Division which was permanently located at Ferozpur was tasked with capturing Barki and mopping up the Pakistanis on the East Bank of the Ichhogil Canal, two Infantry Brigades and Central India Horse commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Satish Chand Joshi were allocated for this task. Barki was located on the road that ran from Harike in India to Lahore. The town sat astride the Ichhogil Canal and was 9.5 kms from the International Border (IB) and 24 kms from Lahore. The Upper Buchar Distributary and the Hudiara Drain were the two major obstacles on the way to Barki. The built-up areas of Hudiara, Nurpur, Barka Kalan and Barka Khrud lay on the approaches to Barki and were well defended. The defences were formidable, concrete pill boxes and had adequate artillery support.

On the 06 September 1965, 4 SIKH commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Anant Singh crossed the IB at 0400 hours as the vanguard of 65 Infantry Brigade offensive thrust on the Kharla- Barki axis and capturing two small villages just across the border on the left-hand side of the road. Alpha Company under Major Shamsheer Singh Manhas had captured Theh Sarja Majra while Bravo Company under Major Dalip Sidhu had captured the Ranger Post at Rakh Hardit Singh. This facilitated the firm base of the Brigade to be established right at the border. 16 PUNJAB commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) JS Bhullar then entered Pakistani



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territory at 0530 hours and captured Ghiwandi Post held by elements of 11 FF (R&S). While these two battalions cleared and guarded the flanks 48 Infantry Brigade under Brigadier KJS Shahney went straight for Hudiara Drain. The leading elements of the Brigade 6/8 GORKHA RIFLES was leading the advance with Alpha Squadron CIH commanded by Major Narinder Dogra, there was no opposition till they reached the drain where Pakistan's Delta Company of 17 Punjab and B Company of 11 FF (R&S) were deployed. By 1030 hours the East Bank of the Drain and Hudiara village were secured but they could move no further due to continuous fire. 5 GUARDS was now ordered to capture Nurpur in an outflanking manoeuvre forcing the rest of the Pakistanis to withdraw from the Hudiara Drain but not before they blew up the 140-foot Bridge. Nurpur village was finally captured at 1730 hours.



Indian Army's officers of 4 Sikh Regiment with a Police Station in the village of Barki at Lahore District, Pakistan

Source: <http://indianarmy.nic.in/writereaddata/documents/Articles1965/Kanwaljitsingh230915.pdf>

As 65 Infantry Brigade had suffered heavy casualties, Major General HK Sibal ordered Brigadier Lerb Ferris, Commander 65 Infantry Brigade, to resume advance at 0700 hours next morning, by which time the Bailey bridge over the Hudiara Drain was expected to be ready. The GOC appreciated the Pakistani strength in the area at two Infantry Battalions, supported by a Squadron of armour and a Regiment of Artillery, reduced of course by the casualties suffered at Hudiara. He allotted the following additional troops to the Brigade:



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- a) Under Command – Central Indian Horse (Shermans) less one Squadron; 94 Field Company; and Tentacle with ACT.
- b) In direct support – 165 Field Regiment.
- c) In support – 7 Artillery Brigade less 165 Field Regiment, one battery 66 Field Regiment and 82 Light Regiment.


Brigadier Ferris had no time for reconnaissance. His appreciation was, therefore, based on a general study of the area and perusal of maps, including the one captured from a Pakistani. Finally, he decided to secure Barka Kalan. The causeway and the Bailey Bridge, 200 yards to the West of Hudiara, became operational by 1545 hours on 07 September. Soon after, 9 MADRAS with B Squadron Central India Horse advanced to capture Barka Kalan and secured it by 1800 hours despite heavy firing from the village. A half-hearted counter-attack launched by Pakistani troops was beaten back. North of the road, the 16 PUNJAB Patrols were subjected to firing from the Barka Khurd village. On 08 September 65 Infantry Brigade decided to capture it and the task was entrusted to 16 PUNJAB. The Battalion launched the attack at 2030 hours on 09 September and captured Barka Khurd by 2100 hours, without suffering any casualty.

7 Infantry Division maintained relentless pressure on the Pakistani defenders and advanced further to capture Barki on its way to the Ichhogil Canal. The task was entrusted to 65 Infantry Brigade, which decided to complete it in two Phases.

1. **Phase I:** 4 SIKH to capture the Barki Village
2. **Phase II:** 16 PUNJAB to capture the East Bank of Ichhogil and destroy the Barki Bridge



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Source: The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India

CENTRAL INDIA HORSE less one Squadron and 7 Artillery Brigade with 5 Field Regiment less one Battery, 66 Field Regiment and 82 Light Regiment were to support the attack. 'H' hour was fixed at 2000 hours on 10 September 1965. There were three approaches to the Barki village - left, right and frontal. The left approach was ruled out for an attack as it lay across flooded paddy fields, lacked any cover, and was dominated by the high Canal bank to the South of the road. The frontal approach lay along the road and to the North of it and provided for better going, although the ground was slightly undulating and without cover. But it was a shorter route and the movement through it was defiladed from enemy weapons, located on the Canal bank. The right approach had a better going, but it involved a long detour from the Brigade's firm base. Further, it was on an unprotected flank, exposed to firing from the weapons located on the Canal bank, to the North of the road. The Brigade, therefore, preferred a frontal approach for the attack.



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As the Pakistanis were occupying prepared defences and were sure to respond with heavy artillery and mortar shelling and the Indians had to pass through an approach, which was bereft of any cover, a night attack was decided upon. Prior to the launching of the attack by 4 SIKH, Indian guns engaged known Pakistani positions from 1930 hours to 1955 hours. From 1955 hours to 2000 hours, the positions at Barki and along the East Bank of the Canal were neutralised. At 2000 hours, the Division artillery, including 5 Field Regiment, effectively engaged Barki village and covered the advance of 4 SIKH. When the assaulting troops neared the objective, Central India Horse less two Squadrons moved forward to provide fire support to them. In the moonlit night, the Indian armour sprayed the Canal bank and the village with fire, effectively. 4 SIKH captured Barki village after overcoming all resistance by 2110 hours. The defenders, lodged in pill boxes, were either killed or captured. According to GOC, 7 Infantry Division, continuous firing by the Indian armour at night, led Pakistanis to believe that the Indians had brought in new tanks with night vision, and hence they abandoned Barki out of fear. "It is said that the Pakistanis took away 4 truck-loads of corpses from the battlefield of Barki.



Barki Memorial, Ferozpur Cantt

Source: <https://ferozpur.nic.in/gallery/barki-memorial-ferozpur-cantt/>

During the attack on Barki village, Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh was in command of the leading Troop of a Squadron of the CENTRAL INDIA HORSE. As his tank entered the village it was



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damaged by a mine. Undaunted, he brought down accurate and heavy fire on the enemy force at the Barki bridge and helped in the completion of the operational task and capture the objective swiftly.

In the actions fought since the 06 September 1965, Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh was always in the forefront and set fine example to his men who were inspired by his courage. He was awarded Vir Chakra for his gallantry.



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CITATION

JC-2807 Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh. The Central India Hone.
(Elective date of award - 10 September 1965)

Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh was in command of the leading troop of a Squadron of the Central India Horse, which with the support of an infantry battalion, attacked Barki village in the Lahore sector on the 10 September 1965. As his tank entered the village it was damaged by a mine. Undaunted, he brought down accurate and heavy fire on the enemy force at the Barki bridge and helped the infantry battalion to complete its operational task and capture the objective swiftly.

In the actions fought since the 06 September 1965, Naib Risaldar Jagdish Singh was always in the forefront and set fine example to his men who were inspired by his courage

Reference: Gazette of India, Notification No. 132-Pres./65. dated 01 January 1966.



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VIDEOS

Why And How India Threatened Lahore In 1965 (Source: StarNewGLobal)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fXJk_w0fi4Q

BATTLE of Dograi. 1965 India Pakistan WAR. Battalion of Jat troops reached the outskirts of LAHORE ((Source: Indian Military History)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ll5hcTPpT6E>

Why And How India Threatened Lahore In 1965 | #pakistan #lahore #nitingokhale #indiapakistan (Source: StarNewGLobal)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJWCZ4VK2M8>

Battle of Lahore | Lahore Front | 1965 India Pakistan War | Tank Battle | #youtubeshorts #shorts (Source: DEFENCE STUDY)
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IN7fhfbRXe0>

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