



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



**SUBEDAR MAJOR & HONY CAPTAIN RAM UJAGAR (Then
HAVILDAR)**

SERVICE NUMBER	1135608
RANK	Subedar Major & Hony Captain (Then Havildar)
NAME	Ram Ujagar
SON OF	Sh. Ambika Pandey
RESIDENT OF (Village/District/State)/ DOMICILE	Village Pandepur Majra, Mahadeopur, Sultanpur, Uttar Pradesh
UNIT/REGIMENT/CORPS	ARTILLERY
SERVICE	Indian Army
DATE OF ENROLMENT/ COMMISSION	19 January 1952
AWARD/DATE OF ACTION	Vir Chakra / 08 September 1965
WAR/BATTLE/OPERATION	1965 Indo Pak War
OTHER AWARDS WITH DATE	



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

Subedar Major & Hony Captain (then Havildar) Ram Ujagar was born on 19 June 1934 in Pandepur Majra Mahadeopur Village of Sultanpur District in Uttar Pradesh. His father's name was Shri Ambika Pandey. Havildar Ram Ujagar was enrolled into the Regiment of Artillery of the Indian Army on 19 January 1952 at the age of eighteen. During the 1965 Indo Pak War, he was posted in Sialkot Sector as part of 71 Medium Regiment. When the enemy opened fire from multiple directions he, disregarding his safety crawled up to the first enemy Light Machine Gun Post, killed two men and captured the gun.



Havildar Ram Ujagar with then President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

Source: Veerta aur Samman: Uttar Pradesh ke shooviron ki Shaurya Gatha

The Regiment of Artillery was raised on 28 September 1827. It was initially raised as Bombay Artillery and was later renamed 5 Bombay Mountain Battery. In May 1857, the mutiny by Indian soldiers started in the artillery of the Army of the Bengal Presidency. The incident prompted a complete ban on Indian artillery units, except the mountain artillery batteries in select provinces. The decision was reversed in the mid-1930s when the first of the Field Regiments of the Indian Army were raised. The Field Regiments support the formations on the field. The regimental motto of Artillery Regiment 'Sarvatra Izzat-O-Iqbal' which means 'Everywhere with Honour and Glory'. The Regiment has given Indian Army five chiefs, General Paramasiva Prabhakar Kumaramangalam DSO, OBE (07 June 1966 – 07 June 1969) General Om Prakash Malhotra PVSM (31 May 1978 – 31 May 1981) General Sunith Francis Rodrigues PVSM, VSM (30 June 1990 – 30 June 1993) General Sundararajan Padmanabhan PVSM, AVSM, VSM (30 September 2000 – 31 December 2002) General Deepak Kapoor PVSM, AVSM, SM, VSM (30 September 2007 – 31 March 2010).




रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

The ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and Indian frontiers with Pakistan have remained a sensitive zone for years. Pakistan has on and off resorted to firing, incursions and intrusions at several points of these frontiers, compelling India to adopt defensive measures. These attempts of Pakistan have been met by the Indian Armed Forces with commendable bravery and steely resilience, but always with great restraint to not escalate the conflict. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 was the second war fought between these two bordering countries. While India was still recovering from the damages of Sino-India war of 1962, Pakistan saw it as an opportunity to acquire Jammu and Kashmir with might, presuming India to be weak in terms of defence preparation. The war initiated on 24 April 1965, when Pakistan Army, attacked our territory in the Rann of Kutch and penetrated six to eight miles inside the Indian territory. This act of illegal occupation of Indian territory constituted violation of Indo-Pak Border Agreement 1960 and international law as per the United Nations Charter. The Pakistani forces subsequently intruded in Kashmir with the launch of Operation Gibraltar.



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



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□ BASED UPON SURVEY OF INDIA MAP WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE SURVEYOR GENERAL OF INDIA,
□ THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CORRECTNESS OF INTERNAL DETAILS RESTS WITH THE PUBLISHER.
□ THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF INDIA EXTEND IN TO THE SEA TO A DISTANCE OF TWELVE NAUTICAL MILES MEASURED FROM THE APPROPRIATE BASE LINE.
□ THE EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES AND COASTLINES OF INDIA AGREE WITH THE RECORD/MASTER COPY CERTIFIED BY SURVEY OF INDIA.

Source: [http://indiastrategic.in/topstories4041 Operation Gibraltar was Fundamentally Flawed.htm](http://indiastrategic.in/topstories4041%20Operation%20Gibraltar%20was%20Fundamentally%20Flawed.htm)

The infiltration of the Gibraltar Force at various points across the 750-km long Cease-fire Line and the International Border between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir began on 05 August 1965. It covered areas of Jammu, Punch and Uri in the west, Tithwal in the North-West, Guraiz in the North and Kargil in the North-East. Initially, about 1,500 infiltrators crossed over in small batches, and concentrated at selected points inside Kashmir to organise themselves into larger groups. They were equipped with light automatic weapons and their aim, apart from sabotage, was to indoctrinate the Kashmiris so that they could revolt against India.¹ The period of the infiltration

¹ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thaplialy (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

campaign was characterised by intense, hectic activity throughout the J&K Theatre with special emphasis in the Valley. The raiders and own forces marched and counter-marched all over the inhospitable terrain in a vast grim game of hide and seek. Several times during the day the opponents met, clashed and reeled apart in a series of bloody actions, weaving a confused pattern hard to unravel.²

The second batch of infiltrators, comprising some 6000 men, was pushed into Jammu and Kashmir in the third week of August. Taking into account the replacements for those who "exfiltrated", it is estimated that on the whole, about 8,000 infiltrators participated in these operations. By the first week of September 1965, a third batch of infiltrators, approximately 5,500 strong, was ready in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir for induction. But it could not be sent across the border due to the counter offensive launched by India in Punjab.³ The plan failed with their early detection and lack of support from the locals, who gave away their positions. In sheer desperation, Pakistan also employed its artillery in support of guerrilla operations in the Chhamb area. India grasped the criticality of the ongoing plan, repulsed the attacks and cut off the entry and exit points into the Kashmir Valley. A quick and firm response by India took Pakistan by surprise and thwarted their well laid out plans.

To ease Pakistan's pressure on Chhamb, India opened a second front in Sialkot Sector. It was strategically a vital area and a threat to it was likely to hurt Pakistan most. Loss of Sialkot would have made Pakistan's position in Chhamb untenable and therefore, any Indian move in that direction would have created a great scare in Pakistan. On the other hand, it would have served the Indian interest very well indeed. This second diversionary move was launched by I Corps, led by Lieutenant General PO Dunn, on 08 September, 1965.

² War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, VrC (1991). Lancer International, New Delhi

³ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



Indian soldiers with a destroyed Pakistani M4A1 Sherman tank

Source: Work of Brig. Hari Singh Deora A.V.S.M https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1965_Indo-Pak_War_DestroyedShermanTank.jpg

The Operations in Samba-Jammu-Sialkot Sector covered the area between the Ravi and the Chenab Rivers, with the Indo-Pak border running close to the foothills in the East. The road-link between J&K and the rest of India runs through a narrow stretch of the lower foothills, parallel to the border. The International Border is 28 km from Jammu and 14 km from Sialkot, a major Pakistani communication centre. Sialkot was connected with Lahore by rail via Wazirabad-Gujranwala, and also via Pasrur-Narowal and Pakistani supplies to the Chhamb sector passed through it. The Sialkot- Pasrur stretch of this railway line was a vital link in the Pakistani defence system. Chawinda was a small town of strategic importance on the Sialkot- Pasrur railway line.

HQ I Corps under Lieutenant General PO Dunn had been located at Kaluchak (near Jammu) by 04 September. Troops made available to the Corps included the following:

- a) 1 Armoured Division (Major General Rajinder Singh, MVC)
- b) 6 Mountain Division (Major General SK Korla, DSO, MC)
- c) 14 Infantry Division (Major General RK Ranjeet Singh)
- d) 26 Infantry Division (Major General ML Thapan)



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

I Corps was assigned the task of securing area Pagowal (Bhagowal), Phillora (Phillaurah), Chawinda, and the Cross Roads with a view to advancing towards the Marala-Ravi Link Canal, and eventually to the line of Dhallewali-Wuhilam-Daska-Mandhali. The operation was code-named 'Operation Nepal'.



A CAPTURED PATTON TANK BEING EVACUATED TO THE 'A' VEHICLE BACKLOADING POINT ON A DYSON TRAILER

Source: <https://www.jammukashmirnow.com/Encyc/2020/9/5/5th-September-When-India-Captured-Sialkot-Sector.html>

By last light on 07 September, I Corps had made all preparations to cross the International Border on a frontage extending from Degh Nadi to Suchetgarh. All formations were deployed as per the plan, except for 14 Infantry Division, as its 58 Infantry Brigade, deployed at Madhopur Road Bridge and the Headworks, could not be relieved. 28 Infantry Brigade, which had been allocated to 6 Mountain Division, also could not join as it was deeply involved in Chhamb Sector. At 2300 hours on the night of 07/08 September, 6 Mountain Division and 26 Infantry Division crossed the International Border into Pakistan. 'Operation Nepal' was on the move.⁴

⁴ The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE


As stated earlier, the Indian 6 Mountain Division was tasked to capture Charwa and Maharajke with a view to establish a bridgehead for the break out of 1 Armoured Division by first light of 08 September, and then exploit further towards Pagowal. The operation was to begin at 2300 hours on 07 September and end by 0430 hours the next day. The Division assigned the task of capturing Charwa to 99 Mountain Brigade and Maharajke to 69 Mountain Brigade Group in Phase I of the Operation. 35 Infantry Brigade which joined the Division on 07 September, was asked to exploit further towards Pagowal in Phase II of the operation.

Charwa village, the objective assigned to 99 Mountain Brigade, was a built-up area. The Brigade appreciating that assault on the village would be hazardous during the hours of darkness, selected objectives on the flanks for initial attack. At 2030 hours on 07 September, two Companies of 6 GARHWAL RIFLES along with their Commando Platoons crossed the international border to secure the Brigades Forming Up Place. It was secured by 2030 hrs.⁵ 2/5 GORKHA RIFLES (FF) on the left and 4 RAJPUTANA RIFLES on the right crossed the Start Line (SL) at 2300 hours. Intense artillery shelling covered the assault, The Gorkhas in a swift action captured the objective after evicting a Rifle Company and a Company of Mujahids. 106 mm recoilless guns were effectively used to blast enemy strongholds, in the village school area. On the right flank, 4 RAJPUTANA RIFLES was successful in neutralising the opposition of a Rifle Company, and a Company of Mujahids. The opposition was cleared by both the Battalions by 0300 hours, well ahead of the schedule. Exploiting further, the Battalions pushed forward beyond their objectives to cover the roads coming to Charwa from Maharajke, Chobara and Ikhnal (Nakhnal). The battle for the village of Charwa was a grim one as it was a formidable stronghold fortified with elaborate defensive works including an intricate network of underground tunnelling. Moreover, the defenders fought with courage and determination. Though the main opposition was overcome by 5 GARHWAL RIFLES on the night of the attack itself, pockets of resistance lingered on for another two days.

⁵ War Despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, VrC (1991). Lancer International, New Delhi



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



Dr. Karan Singh, then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, along with General Rajinder Singh Sparrow on a captured Pakistan Army Tank during the 1965 war in Sialkot sector.

Source: https://x.com/vikramaditya_JK/status/1052164867887652864

The attack on Maharajke by 69 Mountain Brigade was planned in two phases. In Phase I, 3 MADRAS and 9 KUMAON, were to capture the right half of the objective and block the road to Pagowal/Badiana and Sialkot. In Phase II, 4 MADRAS was to capture the left half of the objective, and block the road to Charwa and Zafarwal. By 1700 hours on 07 September, two Companies of 4 MADRAS secured the Forming Up Place to the South-East of Jabwal Kalan. At 2250 hours 3 MADRAS and 9 KUMAON formed up and launched the operation at 2300 hours. The right half of the objective was secured against light enemy opposition (Company plus) by 0130 hours. Phase II of the operation was launched by 4 MADRAS at 0300 hours. But soon heavy MMG and small arms fire held up the assault. At this stage, Lieutenant Colonel HL Mehta, the Commanding Officer, rushed forward to lead the assault and the objective was secured by 0530 hours. In this battle, Lieutenant Colonel Mehta led one of his reserve Companies in person. Inspired by his presence in the in a tactically sound outflanking move. foremost line of attack, the men pressed home the attack with fierce determination. The enemy stronghold could not withstand the gallant charge of the Madrasis and collapsed.

1 Armoured Division, located in Jalandhar, had been brought to Ramgarh on 05 September 1965, with a view to launch the most vital thrust of OPERATION NEPAL, On the night of 06/07




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MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

September, it completed concentration near Ramgarh so as to smash through enemy territory at first light on 08 September, and capture Phillora. The advance was planned as follows:

- a) 1 Armoured Brigade under command Brigadier KK Singh, on axis Ramgarh-Kangre (Rangre)-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora.
- b) 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade under Command Brigadier HS Dhillon on axis Deoli- Sabzpir Cross Road-Mastpur-Pagowal.
- c) One regimental group (4 HORSE) with one Company of motor battalion (9 DOGRA) to form the GOC's reserve for use on any of the two axes.
- d) One squadron of 62 Cavalry to guard the left flank of the Division and operate West of Degh Nadi from Ikhnal to Kangre under Command 1 Armoured Brigade.
- e) 1 Artillery Brigade (under Command Brigadier OP Malhotra), and 2 Field Regiment (SP) and 101 Field Regiment (SP) were placed in direct support under the Command of 1 Armoured Brigade and 43 Lorried Infantry Brigade, respectively. 71 Medium Regiment was placed in direct support of 1 Armoured Brigade, to move along the Centre Line.



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



Indian Thrusts to Phillaurah-Chawinda during 1965 Indo Pak War

Source: The Indian-Pakistan War of 1965: A History. S.N. Prasad. U.P. Thapliyal (2011). Natraj Publishers and Ministry of Defence, Government of India

During the attack, on 08 September 1968, when the Reconnaissance Party of 71 Medium Regiment, which had reached Kangre village in the Sialkot Sector⁶ was ordered to go into action near village Kangre in the Sialkot Sector in Pakistan. As the guns were going into action, an enemy Light Machine Gun opened fire. It was extremely effective and caused heavy casualties to our men and equipment. Any move in the area became almost impossible. Meanwhile the enemy opened fire from other directions also. Havildar Ram Ujagar of 71 Medium Regiment crawled up to the first enemy light machine gun post, killed two men and captured the gun. He then came

⁶ 1. D. K. Palit, History of the Regiment of Artillery: Indian Army (Leo Cooper, 1972).



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

back and organised the defence of the area and was thus able to save the Battery from further casualties.

Throughout this action, Havildar Ram Ujagar displayed great courage and exemplary devotion to duty in the best traditions of the Indian Army. He was awarded Vir Chakra.



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

CITATION

Havildar Ram Ujagar 1135608, The Regiment of Artillery
(Effective time of award-8th September 1965)

On 08 September 1968, a medium battery was ordered to go into action near village Kangre in the Sialkot Sector in Pakistan. As the guns were going into action, an enemy light machine gun opened fire. It was extremely effective and caused heavy casualties to our men and equipment. Any move in the area became almost impossible. Meanwhile the enemy opened fire from other directions also. Havildar Ram Ujagar crawled up to the first enemy light machine gun post, killed two men and captured the gun. He then came back and organised the defence of the area and was thus able to save the battery from further casualties.

In this action Havildar Ram Ujagar displayed great courage and exemplary devotion to duty.

Reference: Gazette of India, Notification No. 15-Pres./66 dated 12 February 1966.



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

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रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

MEMORIAL



Havildar Ram Ujagar's Memorial at Sultanpur Railway Station, Uttar Pradesh
Source: Source: Veerta aur Samman: Uttar Pradesh ke shoorviron ki Shaurya Gatha



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE

VIDEOS

हाथ पैरों से लड़ी गई 1965 India-Pak War की सबसे खूनी लड़ाई | Dograi | India History Hindi
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Battle Of Chawinda | Indo Pak War 1965 | Lieutenant Colonel Ardeshir Tarapore | Veer by
Discovery (YouTube Veer by Discovery)

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