



रक्षा मंत्रालय
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE



HAVILDAR SARUP SINGH

SERVICE NUMBER	9105087Y
RANK	Havildar
NAME	Sarup Singh
SON OF	Kishan Singh
RESIDENT OF (Village/District/State)/ DOMICILE	Doda District, Jammu and Kashmir
UNIT/REGIMENT/CORPS	14 J&K MILITIA (Presently LADHAK SCOUTS)
SERVICE	Indian Army
DATE OF ENROLMENT/ COMMISSION	15 April 1948
AWARD/DATE OF ACTION	Maha Vir Chakra (Posthumous)/19 October 1962
WAR/BATTLE/OPERATION	1962 Indo-Sino War
OTHER AWARDS WITH DATE	



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Havildar Sarup Singh was born on 15 April 1924 in Koteri village of Poonch District in Jammu & Kashmir. Son of Sri Kishan Singh, Havildar Saroop Singh enrolled into the Indian Army on 15 April 1948 at the age of 24 years.¹ During 1962 Sino-India War, Havildar Sarup Singh was part of the 14 Jammu and Kashmir Militia fighting in the Dault Beg Oldi Sector of Northern Ladakh.

The Ladakh Scouts known as the “Snow Warriors” were initially raised as a Paramilitary Force formed of Ladakhi locals known as Nubra Guards to save Ladakh from intruders in 1948. It comprised of Ladakhi locals who are physically fit and attuned with the rugged terrain and hostile climate. The Ladakh Scouts was raised in 1963, following the Indo China War of 1962. It had two Wings- the Karakoram Wing, defending the Eastern front facing China and the Indus Wing facing Pakistan. The Regiment currently consists of five battalions. The Ladakh Scouts had fought in the 1965 and 1971 India Pakistan War and were also part of Operation Meghdoot in 1984. Ladakh Scouts was converted into a Regiment in the year 2000. The Ladakh Scouts played a significant role during the Kargil War of 1999 by marking one of the earliest victories and also received the Unit Citation from General VP Malik, the then Chief of Army Staff.²

Since its independence, India followed a foreign policy of maintaining cordial relations with China. It wanted to revive its ancient contacts with the people of China since both the countries shared political, geographical and cultural similarities. Therefore, soon after its establishment on 01 October 1949, India was one of the first few countries to grant diplomatic status to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). India supported the demand of state recognition of PRC on various international platforms. India took the initiative to enter into negotiations with China on the question of Tibet and entered into the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954. Within a few weeks of Chou Enlai’s visit to India, the Chinese launched a protest against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti, three kilometers South of a border pass, Tun Jun La in Uttar Pradesh. This was the first time, the Government of China laid claim to any part of Indian territory formally. The construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang Road in 1957, marked a turning point in the Sino-India relations as the Chinese occupied a large part of the Aksai Plateau. This opened an opportunity for China to come out with territorial claims against India openly. By 1959, Chinese soldiers moved in further into Ladakh and established themselves at Chushul- Rezag La, and at Mandal, just South of Dambu Guru. On 08 September 1962, about 600 Chinese troops encircled the Dhola Post in the Eastern sector and began firing. The Chinese launched simultaneous attacks in NEFA in Namku Chu Sector as well as in Ladakh. The overwhelming number of the Chinese troops hit the Indian


¹ The Honourpoint- An online memorial for every Indian Soldier
<https://www.honourpoint.in/profile/sub-sonam-stobdan-mvc-2/>

² Ballabh, Anand, Insights into Infantry Regiments: A Basic Factbook. Forward Books publications. New Delhi (2013)



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soldiers but they fought the enemy with grit and determination. The Chinese announced the cease-fire at midnight of 21/22 November 1962.³



Source: Wikipedia

During the Sino-India War of 1962, Havildar Sarup Singh was deployed in Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) Sub-Sector of Northern Ladakh. DBO was a vitally important Post since four tracks radiated from it. The old Silk Route went North, crossed the Karakoram Pass (5575 meters) and went on to Yarkand in Sinkiang. The other two routes connected DBO to Leh, over 200 kilometres away, and requiring at least twelve days of long and difficult marching to reach it. The Eastern or Winter route went due South from DBO crossing the Track Junction, Chip Chap River and the Depsang Plains to reach the Murgo Post. 14 J&K Militia (now LADHAK SCOUTS) was

³ History of the Conflict with China, 1962. P.B Sinha. Col A.A. Athale (1992). History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.



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responsible to defend the DBO area and a Company of 5 JAT was deployed alongside. On 17 October 1962 reports of heavy Chinese concentration opposite our Post Chandani started coming in. This concentration of Chinese was so heavy that it posed a threat to entire area of Chip Chap and Kara Koram.



A rough map of Ladakh front in 1962 by Maj Gen Jagjit Singh.

Source: <https://www.indiasentinel.com/opinion/gateway-to-hell-the-1962-operation-in-daulat-beg-oldie-5682>

DBO itself had the Battalion Headquarters and nearly a Company strength. The rest of the available force was distributed on two possible approaches. Chip Chap River valley had a total of ten Posts. Chip Chap Posts 1 to 4 were located North of the river Chip Chap, while Posts 5 to 10 were to the south. Posts 10 to 14 guarded the approach from an uncharted river valley further south. In



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addition, there were some troops in Murgo, Sultan Chushku, Track Junction, and all the way down to Shyok village, to provide staging posts for supply as well as the columns that regularly moved between the main base at Leh and DBO. Out of these twenty-one Posts, DBO had a Company strength and also Posts 1 and 4 on the North of Chip Chap River had a Platoon each (roughly 25 to 30 men). Posts 5, 7 and 14 also had Platoon each. Rest of the Posts had Section strength (between 10 to 15). These Posts were dependent upon DBO for their supply. All the Posts were equipped only with small arms with the exception of Post 1 that had a Section of 3-inch mortars. The Posts thus were not in a position to dominate more than 500 meters distance around them, this being the effective range of the Light Machine Guns. average distance between the Posts was 2 to 3 kms and some like Post 14 were nearly 10 to 12 kms away from nearest Indian Posts. There was thus no possibility of mutual support.

The Chinese had been building up their strength In the Sector from July 1962 onwards. The vicinity of Indian Post No 4 enabled them to bring in their heavy weapons very close to our posts. On 19 October 1962, all the Indian Posts near Chip Chap were dominated by the Chinese in superior strength.



Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with troops at a forward position during the 1962 India-China war.

Source: <https://www.indiasentinel.com/opinion/1962-india-china-war-how-scholars-misled-indians-a-case-study-5846>

The Chinese offensive in this Sector commenced with simultaneous attack on Posts No. 5 and 9 on 19 October 1962 at 2300 hrs. Post 5 (Pramodak) was manned by fourteen Jawans under an NCO of 14 J&K Militia. Post 9 (Bhishan) was held by five Jawans of 5 JAT. The Chinese subjected



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both the Posts to heavy fire from Mortars and Medium Machine Guns. Both the weapons having longer ranges than what the Indians had, the Chinese could remain out of range of Indian: fire. The Indian defences were merely open trenches and Sangars (stone heaps above ground level) as digging into the frozen soil was difficult and there was no stores for construction of overhead cover to protect the Jawans from the splinter effects of the Mortar and Artillery bombardment. Both the Posts were: constantly in touch with the Commander at DBO, Major Shardul Singh Randhawa. It is estimated that the Chinese attacked Post 5 with nearly two Companies and Post 9 with a Company. The Posts continued to resist the Chinese till first light on 20 October, when both the Posts went out of communications with the Headquarters. There were very few survivors. The Chinese occupied Post 5 and blocked the withdrawal and supply routes of other posts deployed to the South East.

On the night of 19/20 October 1962 when Post 9 was attacked by the Chinese, Havildar Sarup Singh was Second-in-Command of the Post 9 and 5 , fought gallantly until he was overpowered and killed by the enemy. Havildar Sarup Singh displayed courage and devotion to duty of high order.

In the battles of Daulat Beg Oldi Sub Sector, Indian troops fought valiantly despite having scarcity of resources and being outnumbered by the Chinese troops. In the fight of Post 1 (Chandani) or Post 4, Subedar Sonam Stopdan and Havildar Sarup Singh of the 14 J&K Militia at Post 9 and 5 made the supreme sacrifice after taking heavy toll of the enemy. Both were honored with the nation's second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Major Sardul Singh Randhawa was also decorated with the MVC for his inspiring leadership, courage, commitment, steadfastness and the manner in which he organized the retreat in the DBO Sub-Sector.



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CITATION

9105087 HAVILDAR SARUP SINGH
14 JAMMU AND KASHMIR MILITIA (Now LADHAK SCOUTS)
(Effective date of Award: 19 October 1962)

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Reference: Gazette of India, Notification No. _____ dated _____



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